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THE PATENT OPTION
Daniel Gervais, PhD*
There is a shift in the shape of intellectual property tools used to
strengthen and lengthen the right of pharmaceutical companies to
exclude others from making and marketing their products. Patents
have traditionally been the tool of choice. Over the past two
decades, however, pharmaceutical companies have increased their
degree of reliance on a right known as “data exclusivity.” This
right, which now exists in most major jurisdictions, is the right to
prevent third parties from relying on the clinical trial data submitted
by another pharmaceutical company to obtain marketing approval
for a bioequivalent or biosimilar product. The right is included in
most international trade agreements.
The patent and data exclusivity regimes are different. The patent
regime is one-size-fits-all; it protects new, useful, and nonobvious
inventions subject to sufficiency of disclosure. In contrast, the data
exclusivity regime has both a different target (only pharmaceuticals)
and purpose (efficacy and safety). The two systems are administered
independently. Yet they apply to the same products and the two
rights belong to the same entities.
The Article conditions the proposed extension on fuller
disclosure of clinical data, which would benefit both the public and
scientists. Although public disclosure of an invention is a key
function of patent law, it is often of poor quality due to excessive use
of “patentese.” In the specific case of pharmaceuticals, it is further
weakened by the fact that patent applications are normally
commenced well before human clinical trials have been concluded.
Under current rules, clinical trial data submitted to governments
are often not made public.
Finally, the Article proposes text to be used in future trade
agreements—with specific modalities for developing and leastdeveloped countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article’s proposal is based on the fact that patents are, and
have always been, optional. The decision to apply for a patent is
multifaceted. It includes, among other factors, the need to weigh
whether trade secret protection would lead to a better result.1 Making


Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law, Professor of French, Director,
Vanderbilt Intellectual Property Program, Faculty Co-director, LL.M. Program,
Vanderbilt Law School.
1
See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly
Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1112 (2012) (“The reason to discuss
patents in an article about the growth of trade secret litigation is that in situations
that present a company the option of patent or trade secret protection, the critical
question is which to pursue. There is no simple answer.”); Andrew BeckermanRodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A
Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 380
(2002) (“When innovative technology or technical know-how is eligible for
either patent or trade secret protection a choice must be made. Although some
would argue the superiority of patent law makes it the clear choice this is not
always true. Numerous legal and business considerations can affect the
choice.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as
IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 338 (2008) (discussing which inventions
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a choice between applying for a patent and relying on trade secret
law is required because generally patents and trade secrets are
mutually exclusive.2
The pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on both forms of
protection: patents for new molecules (due to the high cost of
innovation and the low cost of copying most new molecules), and
trade secrecy protection for manufacturing innovations.3 “Trade
secrecy offers [pharmaceutical companies] the prospect of
suppressing unfavorable information, thereby minimizing the risk to
firms that trials of new uses will diminish sales revenues.”4 There
are several other variables to add to the decision tree that separates
trade secret from patents, including the relative fragility of patents

benefit more from trade secrecy protection than patents, and noting that “the
secrecy requirement serves to channel inventors into the appropriate form of IP
protection”).
2
See Jacob Mackler, Intellectual Property Favoritism: Who Wins in the
Globalized Economy, the Patent or the Trade Secret?, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS.
& INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 284 (2012) (“The disclosure required to obtain a patent
removes the protections offered by a trade secret as a matter of law.”). There are
cases where part of the manufacturing know-how or other information can
remain a trade secret while disclosing enough enable the invention disclosed in
the patent application. See Brian J. Love & Christopher B. Seaman, Best Mode
Trade Secrets, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2013) (“[E]nablement[] is ‘part of the
quid pro quo of the patent bargain’—disclosure in exchange for a limited
monopoly. Enablement, however, only serves as a floor for disclosure. . . .”).
This may allow inventors to maintain monopoly rights after the expiration of the
patent. See W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied
Competition, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1612 (2017) (“[F]irms use the
interlocking effects of patents and difficult-to-reverse-engineer trade secrets to
maintain monopolies long past patent expiration.”).
3
See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32
MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 (1986) (analyzing the need for patents due to the ease of
copying); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 42–43 (2004) (noting
that pharmaceuticals are often easy to copy and “steal”). But see Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 1115, 1130 (2015) (discussing trade secret protections for more
complex molecules such as biologics).
4
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y,
L. & ETHICS 717, 739 (2005) [hereinafter Eisenberg, New Uses].
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after issuance.5 The adoption of federal trade secret legislation in
2016 may have tipped the scales even more in favor of trade
secrecy.6
5

A (valid) patent offers solid protection for up to 20 years after filing. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). In contrast, once a trade secret is out in the open,
even by mistake, it is very difficult to keep it protected. § 122(b)(1)(A). Patent
applications are typically published 18 months after filing of the application, a
point in time at which normally no final decision whether to grant the patent has
been made. Id. This has been part and parcel of the patent bargain almost from
its origin. See, e.g., Elgin Nat’l Watch, Co. v. Bulova Watch Co., 118 N.Y.S.2d
197, 201 (1953) (“There is, of course, no public interest in affording patent
protection to any art which is not novel and patentable. Therefore, a patent does
not prove itself. In the interest of free . . . [use of an invention in the public
domain], a [user] assuming the risks of an infringement suit is allowed to test a
patent.”). After issuance, patents are somewhat fragile: they can be and are
challenged for validity. More than half of all patents challenged in court are
declared invalid in whole or in part. Id. Additionally, courts regularly change the
boundaries of the realm of patentable subject matter and such changes apply to
all existing patents, not just to pending applications. See Almeling, supra note 1,
at 1114–15 (discussing the invalidation of patent claims on a method for
determining dosing ranges of drugs); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3329–30 (2010) (narrowing the eligibility of business method patents); Mayo
Collaborative Serv’s. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)
(invalidating patent claims on a method for determining dosing ranges of drugs);
KSR Intl. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (raising the nonobviousness standard). One could add to this list Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l,
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (limiting the availability of patent protection for
software). Many of those changes have impacted the pharmaceutical industry, as
demonstrated by the litigation concerning the patents on the BRCA gene tests.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107
(2013) (holding that isolated, but otherwise unmodified, genetic material was
not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101). In Mayo, 566 U.S. 66, the Supreme Court
held that certain diagnostic methods were similarly unpatentable. Id. at 90. For a
comment on the impact of the cases on research, refer to Laura W. Smalley, Will
Nanotechnology Products Be Impacted by the Federal Courts’ “Product of
Nature” Exception to Subject-Matter Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. 101?, 13 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 397, 437–38 (2014) (“Some in the industry
believe that Prometheus will have a significant impact on biomedical research
and personalized medicine as expressed in the Petitioners’ brief in Myriad,
others believe and note that certain patents, particularly on genes, stifle basic
research and have negative effects on patient treatment options by placing
certain genes off limits. The biotechnology industry, however, depends on
patent rights to a great extent, because they are the most important asset for
obtaining funding.”).
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Patents are a one-size-fits-all regime. Moreover, neither patents
nor trade secrets are specific to the pharmaceutical industry. To
obtain a patent, the applicant’s invention need only pass the
thresholds of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility.7 The rights of a
patent owner and terms of protection provided do not vary based on
the level of inventiveness.8 The patent system thus pays little, if any,
attention “to whether the drug is an important clinical breakthrough
or an incremental drug of little therapeutic importance.”9 This
unresponsiveness to innovation levels is difficult to avoid in the
patent realm: Patent Offices cannot assess the future efficacy and
side effects of new pharmaceutical molecules because patent
applications are typically submitted well before clinical trials have
been concluded.10 Though early application for a patent is
6

Defend Trade Secrets Act, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2016). This 2016 Act
creates a federal private civil action for trade secret misappropriation but in
extraordinary circumstances, “[it] also authorizes ex parte application for courtordered seizure of property in order to prevent the propagation or dissemination
of a trade secret.” Richard F. Dole, Jr., Identifying the Trade Secrets at Issue in
Litigation Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the Federal Defend Trade
Secrets Act, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 470, 500–01 (2017).
7
35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2018).
8
See § 154(a) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States, . . . for a term beginning
on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on
which the application for the patent was filed.”); see also § 271(a). In rare cases,
extensions of the term are possible. They are discussed infra (see infra Part
II.A).
9
Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 312 (2015). She also notes that
this seems verified empirically: “[S]tudies of pharmaceutical innovation in the
United States, Australia, and Europe all found most new drugs were incremental
innovations and that only between 10 and 30 percent of drugs were more
therapeutically valuable than existing drugs.” Id.
10
See Jaime F. Cárdenas-Navia, Thirty Years of Flawed Incentives: An
Empirical and Economic Analysis of Hatch-Waxman Patent-Term Restoration,
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1301, 1336 (2014) (“Since a corresponding patent
application is filed roughly when pre-clinical trials begin, the time between the
filing of a patent application and the filing of an IND is a good proxy for the
pre-clinical trials phase.”); see also id. at 1382 (discussing the application of this
rule under the European Patent Convention); Shashank Upadhye, To Use or Not
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unavoidably necessary to preserve the novelty of the invention, it
means that the effective term of the patent (that is, as a tool to gain
market exclusivity) is reduced by the time spent on clinical trials,
estimated to be seven and a half to eight years for trials leading to
marketing approval.11
There is a third form of intellectual property (“IP”) that, like
patents and trade secrets, is commonly used by and is specific to the
pharmaceutical industry. It is the right to prevent reliance by third
parties wishing to obtain approval of a product similar to the one
that is already approved for marketing on clinical trial data
submitted by the data originator.12 This right provides another,
to Use: Reforming Patent Infringement, the Public Use Bar, and the
Experimental Use Doctrine as Applied to Clinical Testing of Pharmaceutical
and Medical Device Inventions, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 4 (2002)
(“Accordingly, the potential drug or medical device patentee faces a very real
dilemma: (1) whether to test the product in large-scale trials to generate the
necessary clinical data required by the FDA, but risk creating a public use bar;
or (2) file a patent application and incur the associated costs prior to any clinical
testing, not knowing if the product will ever be marketed or will even work.”);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306, 1320 (Fed. Cir.
2004); see also John W. Schlicher, Biotechnology and the Patent System; Patent
Law and Procedures for Biotechnology, Health Care and Other Industries, 4 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 121, 138–40 (1996) (explaining the Experimental Use
Defense applicable in the face of patent infringement allegations).
11
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 155–56 (2018); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G.
Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 473 (2007) (defining the term clinical
trials); see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, S. 1538, 98th Cong. (1984) (allowing patent extensions in special
circumstances for up to five years, but not exceeding fourteen years from
marketing approval).
12
This is true in US law, as explained infra Part II.B, but also internationally.
For example, NAFTA provides that if “as a condition for approving the
marketing of pharmaceutical . . . products that utilize new chemical entities, the
submission of undisclosed test or other data necessary to determine whether the
use of such products is safe and effective . . . no person other than the person that
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, rely on such data in
support of an application for product approval during a reasonable period of
time after their submission. For this purpose, a reasonable period shall normally
mean not less than five years. . . .”) (emphasis added). See North American Free
Trade Agreement, art. 1711(5)–(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M.
605 (1994).
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powerful form of exclusivity—so much so that it has been dubbed
“the new IP.”13 Though it has been considered a “pseudo-patent,”
the right is more appropriately referred to as “data exclusivity.”14
The overlap between patent protection and data exclusivity has
received some attention in recent scholarship15—though not enough
in this Article’s view. One scholar suggested that patent exclusivity
works better than patents for the pharmaceutical industry and should

13

See Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 53, 54 (2016) (“For almost thirty years, a new form of intellectual
property has grown up quietly beneath the surface of societal observation. It is a
set of government-granted rights that have the quintessential characteristic of
intellectual property and other forms of property—that is, the right to exclude
others from the territory. Beginning with a small piece of legislation in the early
1980s, the system now has tentacles stretching out in many directions. It spans
more than half a dozen smaller arrangements . . . .”).
14
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 359–60 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Innovation Policy]. FDA and other forms of regulatory approvals necessary to
market a new product have also been referred to as “regulatory exclusivities,”
“data exclusivities,” and “market exclusivities.” Yaniv Heled, Regulatory
Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 299, 300 (2015). These forms of
protection are most effective at bringing new products (also new indications for
existing products in the case of the FDA) to the market, not manufacturing
innovation, for which drug companies often rely instead, as noted in the
Introduction, on trade secret protection. See W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do
in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55
B.C. L. REV. 491, 532–36 (2014).
15
See Gary A. Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right with It, 15
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 342 (1999) (“[W]hen used for
the limited purposes to which the Act is suited, orphan drug exclusivity can be a
potent patent substitute.”). A commentator suggested that the “two-tiered”
regime (patents and data exclusivity) was advantageous as it decreased the
burden on the patent office, which could apply very low threshold to judge a
drug’s future utility and let the FDA add “quasi-protection to the truly useful
products.” William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1244 (2006). However, why
one still needs patents in that context is not clear. In addition, that commentator
noted that “using two tiers complicates innovation policy. Instead of solely finetuning patent law’s balance between protection and competition, drug
innovation policy must also balance between institutions–complexities that
caution against the FDA’s seemingly haphazard approach thus far[,]” thus
requiring “institutional balancing.” Id. at 1250.
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be the preferred route.16 This Article takes a different, arguably
opposite approach, suggesting instead to modulate data exclusivity
based on the existence (or not) of a patent, which depends in turn on
whether the inventor or pharmaceutical company chooses (hence the
“option”) to apply for or maintain a patent. Simply put, the idea is
to modify current rules for data exclusivity by extending such
protection if two conditions are met: (a) no patent is applied for or
the patentee lets it lapse; and (b) clinical data are made available to
the public, within limits discussed in the Article.17 Appropriate
variations per country and type of product also form part of the
proposal. The Article uses the optionality of patents as a way
forward. The proposal has three main objectives: protect innovators
by providing an incentive to research also non-patentable
compounds; serve the public’s access to new medicines and to data
about their efficacy; and allow non-market based uses of new drugs
during the exclusivity period by other scientists and competitors.18
This Article’s proposal of a significant transformation of global
regulatory incentives available for pharmaceutical research is
presented against a backdrop of pending trade and investment
agreements that may entrench current regulatory regimes and make
those regimes harder to change and adapt.19 Yet, there is time.20
16

See Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 419, 420–24 (2012).
17
See infra Part III.B.
18
See id.
19
In particular, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”)
between the United States and the European Union. See Daniel Acquah,
Extending the Limits of Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents and Data Outside
the EU—Is There A Need To Rebalance?, 45 IIC INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. &
COPYRIGHT 256, 282 (2014) (“The EU . . . enacted something different with
regard to its data exclusivity law (the introduction of the 8 + 2 + 1 formula) . . . .
In a twist, the American pharmaceutical industries have called for 11 years of
data exclusivity—citing the European example—which could possibly lead to
some form of harmonisation [sic] of law in this area especially with the start of
negotiations on a [TTIP].”). With this in mind, the Article contains treaty
language that could be used as an amendment to existing and future trade
instruments. See app. A and B.
20
As of the summer of 2018, with the United States out of the previously
completed text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), the remaining parties
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This Article’s roadmap is as follows. Part II explicates the ins
and outs of data exclusivity.21 Part III presents the proposed solution
and presents its advantages over the current regime. Part IV
discusses international aspects. It should be read in conjunction with
the Appendix, which contains text that can be used to amend
existing and future intellectual property sections of trade
agreements.
II. DATA EXCLUSIVITY
Data exclusivity has become the new battleground in
international trade negotiations for pharmaceutical companies intent
on increasing international sources of revenue.22 A study of data
exclusivity regimes around the world performed by the
pharmaceutical industry showed that while the introduction in
domestic law of such exclusivity did not correlate with an increase
in investment by pharmaceutical companies, it did drive prices
higher and was more powerful in that respect than patents.23 The
signed a new agreement called the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership (“CPTPP”), which lowered state obligations regarding the
two types of regulatory incentives examined in this Article: pharmaceutical
patents and data exclusivity. See GOV’T OF CANADA, WHAT DOES THE CPTPP
MEAN FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? (Nov. 23, 2018) (“[In regards to] patents
and pharmaceuticals, the parties agreed to suspend the TPP obligations on
patent-term adjustment and patent-term restoration, which required parties to
adjust the patent term in respect of patent office and marketing approval delays.
The parties also agreed to suspend all provisions dealing with data protection for
small-molecule drugs and biologics . . . .”); see also Max Rubinson, Exploring
the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Complexities through the Lens of Its Intellectual
Property Rights Chapter, 31 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 449, 461 (2017).
21
This Article assumes that the reader is somewhat familiar with the basic
tenets of patent law and therefore does not provide a full review of patent law.
22
The shift was clear in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) provisions on
data exclusivity, which go far beyond those contained in the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). See Sean M.
Flynn et al., The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property Chapter in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105, 169–70
(2012). The TRIPS provisions are discussed infra Part II.A.
23
The pharmaceutical industry association published a detailed compilation of
laws showing the status of data exclusivity in 43 countries and the European
Union. See Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines,
INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS & ASS’NS (July, 2011),
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reason why data exclusivity seems to be underperforming as an
incentive to new research is in part because its term often overlaps
with patent protection, and this overlap makes it difficult to parse
the effects of each right, as the study fails to identify cases where
data exclusivity was present without a correlating patent.24 However,
the study shows that data exclusivity can have an effect on prices
and can thus help generate a financial return on investment in
clinical trials.25
Internationally, data exclusivity is fast becoming a new norm: A
2011 study of 43 countries showed that 29 of them (69%) protected
against some form of reliance of the approval of a new chemical
entity by a competitor.26
https://www.ifpma.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/IFPMA_2011_Data_Exclusivity__En_Web.pdf
[hereinafter IFPMA Study]. Legal methods used vary. Some (e.g., Brazil) even
use criminal law and others (e.g., Bahrain) conflate data exclusivity with trade
secret violation thus protecting only disclosure in a manner contrary to honest
commercial practices, not non-reliance. The term of protection varies although a
majority of the countries surveyed (27 countries or 64%) apply five years. Then
there are numerous exceptions allowing reliance in specific circumstances that
vary considerably in both scope and purpose. See id. at 13, 52. For a detailed
study on the impact of data exclusivity on pharmaceutical prices in Jordan, see
Rand Alawi & Ibrahim Alabbadi, Investigating the Effect of Data Exclusivity on
the Pharmaceutical Sector in Jordan, 8 JORDAN J. PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 70
(2015).
24
See IFPMA Study, supra note 23.
25
See id.
26
See id. According to the US Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), a
“new chemical entity” (“NCE”) means a drug that contains no “active moiety”
previously approved by FDA in any other application submitted under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2018). An
“active moiety” essentially means the molecule responsible for the physiological
or pharmacological action of the drug substance. A contrario, all others would
not qualify as “new.” See Council of the European Economic Community,
Council Directive 65/65/EEC (January 26, 1965), amended by Council Directive
87/21/EEC (December 22, 1986); see also the judgment of the European Court
of Justice of December 3, 1998 in The Queen v. The Licensing Authority
established by the Medicines Act 1968 (acting by The Medicines Control
Agency), Ex Parte Generics (UK) Ltd, The Wellcome Foundation Ltd and Glaxo
Operations UK Ltd and Others (1998) (C–368/96), especially [32–37]. This is a
different threshold than the worldwide novelty test used in patent law which
looks for identity between a claimed invention (or, more precisely, each claim in
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To understand the growing importance of data exclusivity, one
should first be familiar with its ins and outs.
A. Overview of Data Exclusivity
Data exclusivity is the right of the originator of pharmaceutical
test data (clinical trials) to prevent reliance on such data by
competitors wishing to obtain marketing approval for their own
bioequivalent product.27 It is not, therefore, market exclusivity for
the product: absent a parallel patent on the molecule or compound
being tested, data exclusivity does not prevent subsequent entrants
from doing exactly what the first entrant did—develop the product,
test it, submit a full application, and launch the drug. Indeed, data
exclusivity has also been described negatively as the “absence of an
abbreviated pathway,” which implies its main feature as forcing a
second-comer to redo clinical trials and submit for approval using
the full, normal pathway.28 The option of redoing clinical trials from
scratch is often illusory as the costs of clinical trials may well
present an insurmountable barrier.29 Moreover, there are potential
ethical issues in redoing clinical tests (assuming some patients
would get a placebo) with a drug that has been shown in previous
the patent application) and a single element of prior art. See Chung-Lun
Shen, Patent Infringement and Reasonable Allowance of New Technologies in
Claim Construction, 25 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 333
n.21 (2015) (“On determination of novelty, the strict identity rule and the
inherent doctrine are implemented to ensure that the invention is anticipated by
known prior art. The strict identity rule focuses on the comparison between the
invention and a single document as prior art.”).
27
Bioequivalence is “the absence of a significant difference in the rate and
extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2018).
28
Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
91, 110 (2016) (emphasis omitted).
29
See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1458 (2013) (“To the
extent that a new filer wishes to conduct his own safety and efficacy studies, the
exclusivity provisions are not a barrier to market entry. Exclusivity provisions
are effective because most safety and efficacy studies are costly and the return
on investment in these studies diminishes with every subsequent market
entrant.”).
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clinical trials to be effective enough to be allowed to be
commercialized.30
Data exclusivity was first introduced in US law by the 1984
Hatch-Waxman Act, which provided for five years of data
exclusivity for applications relating to a new “active ingredient.”31
Under the system put in place by that legislation, an innovator may
apply for three additional years of data exclusivity on approvals for
changes to the drug, such as new uses or dosage forms, but only
when submission of new clinical data is required.32 The Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 added a six-month
period of exclusivity as a reward for conducting pediatric trials of
drugs.33 In the case of a specific category of pharmaceuticals known
as biologics, data exclusivity is provided for 12 years with a
potential addition of 12 more years.34
30

A second set of clinical trials on an already approved drug (by a second
company) would seem to constitute a form of post-marketing clinical trials (that
is, post marketing by the originator). See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical
Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding OffLabel Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 68–81 (2008). In the United
States, such trials are limited by law to very specific cases. Id. at 103–04. There
might be ways in which these regulations could be changed to allow, e.g.,
comparative testing if two molecules in a double-blind study without
encountering the same level of ethical concerns. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, David
Wendler & Christine Grady, What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283
JAMA 2701, 2703 (2000) (describing the seven requirements for determining
whether clinical research is ethical).
31
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). See Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note
14, at 359–60.
32
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii)–(iv) (2018).
33
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997), extended by Best Pharmaceuticals for Children
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
34
See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.
§ 2575(a)(2) (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 262 by adding sub-section (k)(7));
see also S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, S. Res. 36, 111th
Cong. § 602(a)(2) (2009) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 262 by adding sub-section
(k)(7)). Biologics are defined and discussed infra Part II.C. In Europe, by
contrast, the data exclusivity period for biologics is 10 years. See Linfong
Tzeng, Follow-on Biologics, Data Exclusivity, and the FDA, 25 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 135, 145–46 (2010).
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While the common form of data exclusivity regimes is
nonreliance, there is a form of market exclusivity available in this
realm under in the Orphan Drug Act of 1983, which directs the FDA
to grant seven years of market exclusivity for products to treat
orphan diseases (conditions affecting fewer than 200,000 patients in
the United States or roughly 1 in 1,600)—“even if many products
qualifying for exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act have had large
and profitable markets for off-label use.”35 This means that a
competitor could not access the market even if it is willing to
perform clinical trials anew.36

35
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); see also
Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 359; Lietzan, supra note 28, at
110 (“An orphan drug is intended to treat a rare disease or condition; the sponsor
makes this showing by demonstrating that the disease affects fewer than 200,000
persons in this country or that the company does not expect to recover its costs
of research and development when marketing the product. If a drug has been
designated as an orphan drug, then—upon approval—it is entitled to seven years
of market exclusivity.”).
36
The United States is not alone in providing this type of protection. Europe
and Japan have similar mechanisms for orphan drugs in their legislative arsenal
but there are notable differences. See Durhane Wong-Rieger & Francis P.
Rieger, Health Policies for Orphan Diseases: International Comparison of
Regulatory, Reimbursement and Health Services Policies, in RARE DISEASES IN
THE AGE OF HEALTH 2.0 267, 269–70 (Rajeev K. Bali et al. eds., 2014). In
Japan, the target is much narrower than in the US (1 in 30,000 persons as
compared to 1 in 1,600). Id. In Europe the number is closer to the US: It is set at
1 in 2,000 but with “the additional criteria that the disease be considered lifethreatening, seriously debilitating or a serious and chronic condition and having
no satisfactory diagnosis, prevention or treatment.” Id. In both the EU and
Japan, market exclusivity for orphan drugs is set at 10 years. Id. The EU body of
law covering clinical trials is contained for the most part in Directive
2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal
products for human use, OJ L 136/34 30 April 2004; and Regulation (EC) No
726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004
laying down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of
medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European
Medicines Agency, OJ L 136/1, 30 April 2004. Id. For the relevenat Japanese
law, see Article 14-4 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (Law No. 145, 1960).
Id.
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B. The Role of the FDA in Data Exclusivity
1. The FDA
According to its website,
the mission of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research (CDER) is to ensure that drugs marketed in this
country are safe and effective. CDER does not test drugs,
although the Center’s Office of Testing and Research does
conduct limited research in the areas of drug quality, safety, and
effectiveness.37

How it performs this role can be briefly described as follows: After
a period of testing new molecules and compounds, decisions are
made to launch preclinical and then clinical trials. Companies
submit an Investigational New Drug (“IND”) Application, in order
to not only transport the drug across state lines but also determine
whether “the compound exhibits pharmacological activity that
justifies commercial development.”38 This activity is followed by
preclinical studies during which the drug is tested in a lab and animal
species.39 After this, three phases of clinical trials must be conducted
before the FDA will grant approval.40 The FDA explains the three
phases as follows:
Phase 1 involves healthy volunteers and aims to determine the
drug’s most frequent side effects and its metabolization mechanism.
The number of subjects typically ranges from 20 to 80.41 Phase 2 can
only be launched if Phase 1 does not reveal unacceptable toxicity,
emphasizing effectiveness rather than safety.42 The drug is tested
between a few dozen and 300 people with a certain disease or
37

How are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fd
a.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApprov
ed/default.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2018).
38
Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelo
pedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplicatio
n/default.htm (last updated Oct. 5, 2017).
39
The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective,
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/
ucm143534.htm (last updated Nov. 24, 2017).
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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condition.43 If Phase 2 shows effectiveness, Phase 3 studies can
begin, targeting anywhere from several hundred to about 3,000
people.44 The FDA does not manage the clinical trials, although it
can inspect clinical trial sites and does so about 300-400 times a
year.45 Approximately 3% of inspections lead to a finding of
“numerous or serious deviations, such as falsification of data,”
which the FDA classifies “official action indicated.”46
If the clinical trials are successful, the manufacturer can file a
New Drug Application (“NDA”). The drug then enters Phase 4, or
postmarketing research, which requires monitoring of the new
drug’s effects.47 Postmarketing research is divided into
“postmarketing requirements (PMRs)” (studies and clinical trials
that sponsors are required to conduct under one or more statutes or
regulations) and “postmarketing commitments (PMCs)” (studies or
clinical trials that a sponsor has agreed to conduct, but that are not
required by a statute or regulation.48
43

Id.
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Jessica Chao, Examining the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor of the Hatch-Waxman
Act: A Legislative Proposal Granting Mandatory Post-Marketing Exceptions, 32
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 655 (2014).
48
Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInfo
rmation/Post-marketingPhaseIVCommitments/default.htm (last updated Jan. 12,
2016). The FDA can require the following studies or clinical trials:
(1) “Postmarketing studies or clinical trials to demonstrate clinical
benefit for drugs approved under the accelerated approval
requirements in 21 CFR 314.510 and 21 CFR 601.41.” Id.
(2) “Deferred pediatric studies (21 CFR 314.55(b) and 601.27(b)),
where studies are required under the Pediatric Research Equity Act
(PREA).” Id.
(3) “Studies or clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy in
humans that must be conducted at the time of use of products
approved under the Animal Efficacy Rule (21 CFR 314.610(b)(1)
and 601.91(b)(1)).” Id.
(4) Trials to assess a known serious risk related to the use of the drug
or signals of serious risk related to the use of the drug or to identify
an unexpected serious risk when available data indicate the
potential for a serious risk.
44
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The FDA also has regulatory approval powers over drug
labeling. It can “deny a drug application if it finds that the labeling
information is not adequate or is false or misleading [and] . . . must
withdraw approval if it finds a drug is unsafe or the labeling is false
or misleading.”49 Thus, the role of the FDA is not to ensure that a
drug is new, but that it is safe and effective.50 This is assessed on the
basis of evidence that the benefits outweigh the risks.51 The degree
of novelty of the drug is not assessed specifically, but it is a factor
taken into account.52
2. The Hatch-Waxman Compromise
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which introduced data exclusivity into
United States law, was a compromise. On the one hand, it allowed
the extension of patent terms for new pharmaceuticals for the benefit
Id. The last item on the list was added by the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823
(2007)). See also Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Legislative
Background, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCom
plianceRegulatoryInformation/PostmarketingPhaseIVCommitments/ucm064633.htm (last updated June 14, 2018).
49
Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA’s Authority to
Regulate the Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption
Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 588 (2006).
50
Frequently Asked Questions about the FDA Drug Approval Process, FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/SpecialFeatures
/ucm279676.htm (last updated Feb. 7, 2017) (“Drugs intended for human use are
evaluated by FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) to ensure
that drugs marketed in the United States are safe and effective.” (emphasis
added)).
51
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & FOOD AND
DRUG ADMIN., FDA’S APPLICATION OF STATUTORY FACTORS IN DETERMINING
WHEN A REMS IS NECESSARY: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInforma
tion/Guidances/UCM521504.pdf (“This guidance is intended to clarify how the
Food and Drug Administration [FDA or Agency] applies the factors set forth in
section 505-1 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act [FD&C Act] [21
U.S.C. 355-1] in determining whether a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy
[REMS] is necessary to ensure that the benefits of a drug outweigh its risks.”).
52
21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2016), which deals with the content of an IND,
notes that the “amount of information on a particular drug that must be
submitted . . . depends upon such factors as the novelty of the drug.” Id.
(emphasis added).

MAR. 2019]

The Patent Option

373

of innovators; on the other hand, it allowed competitors (“generics”)
to file Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) to gain faster
market access after the expiration of a patent.53 As the House
Committee on the Judiciary noted, FDA rules prior to HatchWaxman “had serious anti-competitive effects” as the “net result of
these rules has been the practical extension of the monopoly position
of the patent holder beyond the expiration of the patent.”54 Under the
ANDA process introduced by the Act, the applicant “need only
prove that the generic drug is interchangeable, or bioequivalent,
with a brand name drug already on the market.”55 Holders of
approved NDAs— typically the patent holders—are required to
disclose all patents that “could reasonably be asserted if a person not
licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of
the drug[,]” the list of which the FDA publishes in a publication
called the “Orange Book.”56
While the introduction of term extension and ANDAs may have
been a step forward, the system put in place by Hatch-Waxman
contains labyrinthine details that reflect the difficulty of reaching a
compromise. Let us take a brief look at some of them to illustrate
the point. First, the filing of an ANDA (also referred to as
“Paragraph IV Certification”) is treated as a technical act of patent
infringement of patents mentioned in the Orange Book.57 This is
known as “patent linkage,” which can be defined as “a practice by
some national regulatory authorities of denying approval of generic
drugs that are ‘linked’ to an existing patent.”58 In other words,
53
In contrast to a New Drug Application (“NDA”), this applies essentially to
small molecules, not biologics, which are discussed infra Part C. See Tam Q.
Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics Under
Existing Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77, 90
(2007) (explaining that any abbreviated approval must occur via the PHSA for
“biological product,” but leaving open the option that certain biologics might be
labeled as “drugs” subject to an ANDA).
54
H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984).
55
Id.
56
21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(1), (c)(1) (2018); see Eisenberg, Innovation Policy,
supra note 14, at 358.
57
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2018).
58
CYNTHIA HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENT AND RELATED RIGHTS 273 (2011);
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despite the dissimilar histories and policy purposes of the patent
system (for inventions in all fields) and the FDA regulatory approval
of new medicines, Hatch-Waxman “links” patents to the FDA
approval.59 A generic drug maker must provide notice to both the
owner of patents listed in respect of the molecule it is seeking to get
approved to manufacture, upon receipt of which notice the patent
owner has the option to sue.60 If the patent owner does not bring suit
within 45 days of the notice, the FDA may issue final approval of
the ANDA once its approval requirements have been satisfied.61 If
the patent holder does sue, the ANDA process is automatically
suspended for 30 months.62 Perhaps as an acknowledgement of the
different institutional roles of the FDA and the USPTO, the Federal
Circuit has held that the Hatch-Waxman Act does not require the
FDA to review patents for validity and relevance (infringement)
before listing them in the Orange Book.63 This might explain the
automatic nature of the suspension but the system has been criticized
as “rife with abuse by patent holders; it effectively requires generic
applicants to engage in multiyear litigation with patent holders
before they may market their medicines.”64 Finally, as part of the
Hatch-Waxman bargain, the first filer of an ANDA obtains a “180day period of generic marketing exclusivity during which time [the]
see also Jennifer D. Cieluch, The FTC Has A Dog in the Patent Monopoly
Fight: Will Antitrust’s Bite Kill Generic Challenges?, 14 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
1, 29–30 (2015).
59
See Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
Prescriptions for Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 107, 145 (2011).
60
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (2018).
61
See id.
62
See id.; see also John A. Vernon, Alan Bennett & Joseph H. Golec,
Exploration of Potential Economics of Follow-on Biologics and Implications for
Data Exclusivity Periods for Biologics, 16 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 55, 63 (2010).
63
See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
64
Frederick M. Abbott, Intellectual Property Rights in Global Trade
Framework: IP Trends in Developing Countries, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
95, 98 (2004). By comparison, not only do applications for generic drug
authorization in the European Union not require an affirmation of patent status,
patent linkage is prohibited. See Peter Picht, New Law on Reverse Payment
Settlements—The Agenda for Courts and the Legislature After the Supreme
Court’s Actavis Ruling, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 105, 136 (2013).
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FDA will not approve” a ANDA filed later by another applicant. 65
This was presented as an incentive to file the first ANDA knowing
that it would likely be accompanied by shouldering the burden of
patent litigation.66
C. Biologics as a Special Case
Biologics are the product of biotechnological manipulations;
they are large, complex molecules, such as monoclonal antibodies
and recombinant proteins typically produced with living cultures of
mammalian, microbial, or yeast cells.67 Biologics are drugs
generally derived from living materials, including blood-derived
products, vaccines, and most protein products. The biotechnology
industry has “brought to market over 254 new medicines, products
that account for one out of every eight prescriptions written
65

Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018); Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need A Re-Designed
Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293,
345 (2015) (“The 180-day generic exclusivity period offered to the first generic
to challenge a pharmaceutical patent creates a financial incentive to bring
generic drugs to market as early as possible, and potentially clears away weak
patents so that other generic firms can enter the market at the end of the
exclusivity period.”).
66
See Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the HatchWaxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 174 (2005) (“[T]o provide an incentive to generic
companies to challenge innovative companies’ patents by making paragraph
certifications, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a 180-day period of marketing
exclusivity to the first ANDA applicant that files a paragraph IV certification as
to a patent, under certain circumstances.”). In 2003, Congress amended the
Hatch-Waxman Act to allow an ANDA filer to bring a declaratory judgment
action for non-infringement and/or invalidity if the patent owner/NDA holder
has brought no infringement action within the 45-day notice period. See 28
U.S.C. § 2201 (2018); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (2018).
67
Section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (21 U.S.C. § 351 (2018))
defines a biological product by a list of product types: a biologic may be “a
virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, . . . or analogous product, . . . applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” Public
Health Service Act, 21 U.S.C. § 351, 42 U.S.C. § 262(i) (2006); see also Vernon
et al., supra note 62, at 65.
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worldwide.”68 The complexity of biologics makes it impossible to
make an exact copy.69 Unlike small-molecule chemical compounds
(where generic replicates can be made), the best one can hope for is
“biosimilar.”70 This explains why the bioequivalence analysis
applicable to small molecule pharmaceutical is not directly portable
to the biologics context. 71
To address issues arising out of the different nature of biologics,
Congress enacted the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act (BPCIA) in 2010 as part of the Affordable Care Act, which “was
intended to help innovators and pharmaceutical drug developers by
streamlining the regulation of biologics, much as the HatchWaxman Act of 1984 did with respect to small molecule generic
drugs.”72 The BPCIA has also been described as “an attempt by
Congress to bring down the cost of biologics.”73 “The BPCIA also
seeks to incentivize innovation by providing the reference product
sponsor (RPS) a period of market exclusivity[,]” abbreviated
regulatory approval pathway for follow-on biologics (“FOBs”).74

68

Sarah Sorscher, A Longer Monopoly for Biologics?: Considering the
Implications of Data Exclusivity as a Tool for Innovation Policy, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 285, 285–86 (2009); see also F. Randy Vogenberg et al., Beyond the
Cost of Biologics: Employer Survey Reveals Gap in Understanding Role of
Specialty Pharmacy and Benefit Design, 5 AM. HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS 23,
23–24 (2012) (explaining that even with a small number of prescriptions,
biologics account for much of the cost increases in prescription plans).
69
See Eric Lawrence Levi, Using Data Exclusivity Grants to Incentivize
Cumulative Innovation of Biologics’ Manufacturing Processes, 66 AM. U.L.
REV. 911, 969 (2017).
70
See id.
71
See Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act:
Innovation Must Come Before Price Competition, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
F., July 2009, at 12.
72
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262); Hunter
Malasky, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Commercial
Marketing in the Spotlight, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., February 2017, at 1.
73
Max Rubinson, Exploring the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Complexities
Through the Lens of Its Intellectual Property Rights Chapter, 31 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 449, 464 (2017).
74
Id.
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In spite of this specific legislative grant of authority, the FDA
has proven resistant to promoting biosimilars approval.75
Additionally, policies such as a naming systems for biosimilars or
state regulations can “burden the substitution of interchangeable
biologics required under the BPCIA [while] offer [ing] no gains in
patient safety or efficacy and muddl[ing] a uniform national
program.”76 These obstacles may “impose costly barriers to entry to
potential biosimilar manufacturers, thereby lengthening original
biologics manufacturers’ effective monopoly periods, inhibiting
innovation in potential biosimilars, increasing drug costs, and
reducing access to the most effective available medications.”77
The BPCIA contains a complex structured patent dispute
resolution process known as the “patent dance.”78 Under the HatchWaxman Act the patent holder submits to the FDA patents for listing
in the Orange Book.79 The BPCIA, in contrast, requires instead that
the patent owner and the applicant “dance,” to “engage in serial
75

See Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to
Entry, 25 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 139, 148 (2015).
76
Id. at 161.
77
Id.
78
See Dov Hirsch, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an
Enigma: Is the Patent Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory?, 27
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 645, 649 (2017); see also Lindsay
Kelly, Biologics in the Practice of Law, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 26
(2016).
79
See Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 358. This is sometimes
referred to as “linkage.” The issue of patent “delinkage” is different; it concerns
delinking the price of pharmaceuticals and the costs of research and
development (R&D). On the use of linkage in the first sense, see e.g.,
Manoranjan Ayilyath, FTAs Knitting a Web of Higher Intellectual Property
Standards Globally?, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 97, 97–98 (2015) (“Data
exclusivity and patent linkage provisions, strikingly similar to the US domestic
laws, also found their way into the statutes of other countries through the doors
opened to them by these bilateral trade agreements.”). On use of delinkage with
the second meaning, see U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT ON THE UNITED
NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL’S HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON ACCESS TO
MEDICINES 5 (2016), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/562094dee4b0d00c1
a3ef761/t/57d9c6ebf5e231b2f02cd3d4/1473890031320/UNSG+HLP+Report+F
INAL+12+Sept+2016.pdf (defining delinkage as a “term used to describe a key
characteristics of any financing model of innovation characterized by the
uncoupling of R&D costs and consumer prices for health technologies”).
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communications to identify the patents that should be subject to
litigation.”80 The patent litigation framework contained in the
BPCIA comprises nearly a third of the total provisions of the Act
itself.81
In his study of biologics marketing regulations, Professor Yaniv
Heled, whose work focuses on legal and ethical aspects of
biomedical technologies, suggests that, despite the flaws of the
BPCIA regime, “a statutory exclusivities regime is preferable to a
patent regime,” in part because it avoids “evergreening.”82 Such a
non-structural change of the biologic is unlikely to result in the
award of a new data exclusivity period.83 Conversely, “affording
patent protection for biological products in parallel to FDAinstituted exclusivities increases the risk of abuse by developers of
biological products in a variety of ways and disserves the public
interest that both regimes were created to promote.”84
The next frontier is synthetic biology, a very recent
development.85 Synthetic biology is “characterized by an increased
reliance on chemically synthesized DNA, rather than the cloned
80
See 42 U.S.C. § 262(I)(8)(A) (2016) (“[An] applicant shall provide notice to
the reference product sponsor not later than 180 days before the date of the first
commercial marketing of the biological product licensed under subsection
(k).”); see also Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1678 (2017)
(holding that the notice may be given prior to FDA approval of the biosimilar).
For an explanation of the background of the patent dance in the BPCIA, see
Brian F. McMahon, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of
2009: Legislative Imprudence, Patent Devaluation, and the False Start of a
Multi-Billion Dollar Industry, 100 KY. L.J. 635, 664 (2012).
81
See McMahon, supra note 80, at 663–64.
82
Heled, supra note 16, at 464–66; see also Janice M. Mueller & Donald S.
Chisum, Enabling Patent Law’s Inherent Anticipation Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L.
REV. 1101, 1106 (2008) (“‘[E]vergreening’ refers to attempts by owners of
pharmaceutical product patents to effectively extend the term of those patents by
obtaining related patents on modified forms of the same drug, new delivery
systems for the drug, new uses of the drug, and the like.”).
83
See Heled, supra note 16, at 463–64.
84
Id. at 462.
85
See Christopher M. Holman, Developments in Synthetic Biology are
Altering the IP Imperatives of Biotechnology, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 385,
462 (2015) (“In 2010, a team of scientists led by Craig Venter captured the
world’s attention by reporting the successful synthesis of a functional bacterial
genome composed entirely of synthetic DNA.”).
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copies of naturally occurring DNA.”86 Whether the pharmaceutical
that a company seeks to market is a traditional small molecule, a
biologic, or a product of synthetic biology, all normally require
marketing approval and a scientific assessment of efficacy which
can be modulated by the regulator without changing the
fundamental nature of data exclusivity.
D. Comparison of Patents and Data Exclusivity
Patent offices in any country generally review patent
applications to determine whether such applications disclose
patentable subject matter and whether that subject matter is new,
useful and non-obvious, and, under US law at least, adequately
described and enabled in the application.87 Unlike the FDA process,
patent applications on new drugs are typically filed well before any
clinical trials have begun—when data on safety and effectiveness is
available. Indeed, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) makes it clear that no “actual evidence of success in
treating humans” is required.88
Non-reliance by a third party on the approval, after clinical
trials, of a particular molecule, protein, or other product is not the
86

Id. at 419–20. The proposal contained in Part III is technologically neutral
because of its emphasis on disclosure and an assessment of efficacy, which
would apply equally, as a legal doctrinal matter, to any type of pharmaceutical.
87
See William G. Giltinan, The Disclosure Function, Academic/Private
Partnerships, and the Case for Affirmatively Used, Multinational Grace
Periods, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 109, 135 (2014) (comparing differences in
the disclosure requirements in different jurisdictions). In countries other than
Canada and the United States, novelty is also required, but instead of utility and
non-obviousness a patent must involve an inventive step and be industrially
applicable. See Linda L. Lee, Trials and Trips-Ulations: Indian Patent Law and
Novartis Ag v. Union of India, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 281, 309 (2008)
(“Inventive step and industrial applicability correlate to the concepts of nonobviousness and utility in the United States.”).
88
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (USPTO), Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure ¶ 2107.03 (9th ed. 2014) (“The applicant does not have to prove that
a correlation exists between a particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use
of a compound as a matter of statistical certainty, nor does he or she have to
provide actual evidence of success in treating humans where such a utility is
asserted. Instead, as the courts have repeatedly held, all that is required is a
reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use.”).

380

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 20: 357

same as a patent right to prevent anyone from making or using an
invention. The fact that patents and data exclusivity can operate like
telescoping powers to exclude has been acknowledged by
regulators. The FDA website refers to, for example, “patents or
other periods of exclusivity on brand-name drugs,” both of which
must expire before generic versions are available.89 In a summary of
the various data exclusivity periods available, the FDA also notes
that “[e]xclusivity is exclusive marketing rights granted by the FDA
upon approval of a drug and can run concurrently with a patent or
not.”90 The two rights overlap and produce similar exclusory effects
reflecting different normative objectives.
Patents and data exclusivity can be compared systematically:
• A patent is a right to prevent others from making, using, and
selling.91 Data exclusivity by contrast prevents reliance on
the existence of satisfactory test data, thus forcing a
competitor to perform its own tests and obtain separate
approval, or wait for the non-reliance period to end.92
• Patents operate in a one-size-fits-all regime.93 Data
exclusivity is not. US law already reflects such differences
up to a point. It contains distinct regimes for orphan drugs,
biologics, and new chemical entities.94

89

Drugs are Developed and Approved, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelo
pedandApproved/default.htm (last updated October 4, 2018).
90
FDA/CDER SBIA Chronicles, Patents and Exclusivity, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (May 19, 2015), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapp
rovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm447307.pdf.
91
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
92
See Shepherd, supra note 75, at 161.
93
Eisenberg, Innovation Policy, supra note 14, at 364 (“The patent system is a
one-size-fits-all legal regime that applies essentially the same rules to inventions
arising in biopharmaceutical research, automotive engineering, information
technology, semiconductors, rocket science, and even business methods. But the
needs of these fields for patent protection differ greatly, making it difficult to
fine-tune the patent laws to meet the needs of the pharmaceutical industry
without upsetting the balance of protection and competition in other
industries.”).
94
See Feldman, supra note 13, at 70–82.
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Patents have been described as a contract between an
inventor and society, and the exchange of considerations is
a limited monopoly on one side and public disclosure on the
other.95 Data exclusivity requires little and sometimes no
disclosure of test data. The proposal contained in this Article
is meant to rebalance data exclusivity by requiring
disclosure.
A patent is (much) cheaper to obtain than clinical trial data.
Proceeding through all three phases of pre-marketing
clinical trials in the United States costs hundreds of millions
of dollars.96 In the case of biologics, development and trial
costs combined can reportedly reach over 2 billion dollars,
while a patent application costs a very small fraction of that
amount.97 The costs of clinical trials in other jurisdictions can

See Pfaff v. Wells Elec’s., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent
system represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation
and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for
an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”).
96
See Kimberly Rhodes & Michael Romeo, Syncing the Unsyncable: Legal
and Policy Implications of Paperless Clinical Trials, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH.
L.J. 185, 188 (2017) (“According to the FDA, 70% of drugs pass phase one,
33% pass phase two and 25% to 30% pass phase three. To put those numbers
into more understandable terms, according to the FDA, roughly six out of every
one hundred drugs that begin the clinical trial process make it past phase three.
Moreover, some sources suggest that the time from lab to market for a new drug
is about 15 years, and costs can be upwards of $30 to $40 million just for the
first three phases of a clinical trial, and then another $30 to $40 million if the
drug makes it to phase four. Some studies even suggest that when accounting for
all the ‘behind the scenes’ costs, the average cost of getting a drug from lab to
market could be as high as $1.3 billion.”).
97
See Joseph DiMasi & Henry Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical
R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 473–76
(2007) (mentioning $1.24 billion in 2005 dollars as an estimate of the overall
economic cost of bringing a new biologic to market); see also Lietzan, supra
note 28, at 107 (mentioning $2.6 billion in 2013 dollars for the 1995 to 2007
period). By contrast, the figure of $500,000 is often mentioned as an average to
patent an invention in most significant jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kelce Wilson &
Claudia Tapia Garcia, How Much Should You Invest in Patents?, 45 LES
NOUVELLES 47, 54 (2010). The cost comparison ratio is about 5,000/1 by
dividing the amount to patent an invention by the total from the 1995 to 2007
period.
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be significantly lower, however.98 In China for example,
clinical trials tend to be about one third of the average cost
of those in the United States.99
The terms of protection are different. A patent has a fixed
term ending 20 years from the date of filing. In the case of
new pharmaceuticals, much of this time is spent on proving
that the drug works and obtaining approval from the Food &
Drug Administration (FDA), which led Congress to allow
patent terms to be extended using a complex formula based
in part on the time required to secure approval.100 Data
exclusivity tends to last five years in most territories that
have a fixed term. Longer terms are available in a few
jurisdictions, often for specific products such as biologics, or
to encourage additional research, as with pediatric
indications.101
A patent can be invalidated after issuance for lack of novelty
or utility (industrial applicability), lack of obviousness
(inventive step), or because the subject matter is patent-

This is according to a figure mentioned in Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH
ECON. 151, 166 (2003). This figure is highly debatable. A 2015 study showed
that costs vary by type of field of medicine but range in the $30–40 million per
phase. See Aylin Sertkaya et al., Examination of Clinical Trial Costs and
Barriers for Drug Development, E. RES. GRP. (July 25, 2015),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/examination-clinical-trial-costs-and-barriers-drugdevelopment; see also Rhodes & Romeo, supra note 96, at 188 (stating that
reports of large cost centers not associated directly with clinical trials, also
known as “behind the scenes” costs, can bring the total cost to a multiple of the
actual clinical costs).
99
See Benjamin P. Liu, Fighting Poison with Poison? The Chinese
Experience with Pharmaceutical Patent Linkage, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 623, 649–50 (2012).
100
A patent has an initial term of protection of 20 years from the filing date.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018). However, in the United States, maintenance
fees must be paid at 3 to 3.5 years, 7 to 7.5 years, and 11 to 11.5 years after the
date of issue (with 6 months “grace periods” after each one). See 35 U.S.C.
§ 41(b) (2018). For a discussion regarding the exclusivity of data, see HatchWaxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
101
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
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ineligible.102 A recent study found that biotechnological
patents suffered from a higher invalidation rate
(approximately 42 percent) than the average invalidation
rate (approximately 29 percent).103
A valid patent provides a strong right, namely the exclusive
right to make, use or sell, subject only to exceptions such as
experimental use.104 By contrast, a competitor of a firm that
has obtained FDA approval can, even during the data
exclusivity period, conduct clinical trials and obtain
approval separately if it is not relying on the data.105 This key
limit to the right provided by a data exclusivity period is that
it allows competitors to seek their own approval to sell the
same product by performing their own tests, although in
many cases this limit is mostly theoretical. 106 This is not
applicable in the case of orphan drugs for which exclusivity
is ratcheted up from non-reliance to full market exclusivity.107
The data to be presented to obtain a patent and FDA approval
are vastly different in scope and purpose. To obtain a patent,
which is typically applied for early in the drug development
process to maintain novelty, there is no need to demonstrate
the drug’s safety and efficacy on humans.108 The patent

See generally LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW
HANDBOOK § 3 (2008).
103
See Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 18
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 153 (2015).
104
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, . . . or sells any patented invention,
within the United States . . . during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018).
105
See Trevor M. Cook, Regulatory Data Protection in Pharmaceuticals and
Other Sectors, in IP HANDBOOK FOR BEST PRACTICES (Anatole Krattiger et al.
eds., 2007), http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch04/p10/.
106
See Johnson, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
107
See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing orphan works); see
also TREVOR M. COOK, THE PROTECTION OF REGULATORY DATA IN
PHARMACEUTICAL AND OTHER SECTORS 440 (2000).
108
See Amanda Fachler, The Need for Reform in Pharmaceutical Protection:
The Inapplicability of the Patent System to the Pharmaceutical Industry and the
Recommendation of a Shift Towards Regulatory Exclusivities, 24 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1059, 1070, 1079 (2014).
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application, which will typically be published eighteen
months after filing, should enable a “person having ordinary
skill in the art” (PHOSITA) to make and use the molecule,
with very little else on the molecule’s efficacy in actual
patients.109 At the FDA, in contrast, the applicant is required
to provide “chemical-ingredient lists accompanied by a
statement of the drug’s composition; a detailed report
containing how and where the drug was manufactured,
processed and packaged;” as well as “samples of the drug or
its components at the request of the Secretary; samples of the
proposed drug label; and any supplemental documentation
as deemed necessary by the Secretary or with respect to the
drug’s pending approval.”110
Finally, in some countries, a patent allows the patent holder
to prevent importation of a product legally put on the market
with the patent holder’s consent in another country, a right
to prevent what is known as “parallel importation.”111 This
matter is not regulated by the TRIPS Agreement, however,
which allows WTO members to set their own rules in respect
of parallel imports.112 The United States generally applies

See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2018) (discussing the publication of
pending applications). For a discussion regarding the type of data required to
support a patent application for a new pharmaceutical, see Antoinette F.
Konski, The Utility Rejection in Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Prosecution
Practice, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 821, 824–25 (1994) (“Proof of
utility also can be established by clinical, in vivo or in vitro data, or
combinations of these, as long as the evidence would be convincing to one
skilled in the art. The level of proof for meeting this requirement varies with the
claimed subject matter. For example, for chemical compounds or compositions
having structures similar to those of well-known chemical entities that have an
accepted utility, no proof of utility should be required beyond the assertion of
utility in the application.”).
110
Fachler, supra note 108, at 1070.
111
See Daniel Gervais & Susy Frankel, International Intellectual Property
Rules and Parallel Importing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXHAUSTION AND
PARALLEL IMPORTS 85 (I. Calboli & E. Lee eds., 2016).
112
TRIPS Agreement, infra note 158, at art. 6. Some countries apply so-called
national or regional exhaustion, thus requiring that the product be first put on the
market in that country or region (e.g., the European Union) to be sold legally.
See Enrico Bonadio, Parallel Imports In A Global Market: Should a
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international exhaustion in this field, allowing importation
of a patented product marketed in a foreign territory into the
US market.113 In the case of data exclusivity, the question is
whether a government can rely on foreign approval of a new
pharmaceutical to allow marketing of the product in its
territory.
III. A NEW ROLE FOR DATA EXCLUSIVITY
The system of legal incentives for pharmaceutical research is not
working well for either innovators or for other constituencies in this
debate, including the public. It seems that “there is compelling
evidence that the current periods of FDA-administered exclusivity
are inadequate because pharmaceutical companies continue to
screen drugs with weak patent protection out of their pipelines.”114
This Article’s proposal to ameliorate the current regime is to
increase data exclusivity in exchange for not applying for a patent,
letting it lapse, or licensing it to anyone on a royalty-free basis.
Details are contained in the next section, and all advantages of the
proposed solution are explained in Section B of this Part.
In many cases one of the main advantages will be precisely that
the patentable nature of the invention will not matter. Many
Generalised International Exhaustion be the Next Step?, 33 EUR. INT. PROP.
REV. 153, 154 (2011) (“A Community-wide exhaustion has been affirmed by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) since the 1960s and then codified in several
IPR-related directives and regulations.”).
113
See Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1528
(2017), rev’d 816 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This is true as a matter of patent
law but other forms of regulation may prevent importation such as safety
concerns. See William E. Ridgway, Realizing Two-Tiered Innovation Policy
Through Drug Regulation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1250 n.119 (2006) (“TRIPs
does not prevent because of its exception for exhaustion of intellectual property
rights. The pharmaceutical industry prevents parallel imports through
the FDA instead, by prohibiting importation of products made for foreign
markets governed by different labeling requirements.”); see also Todd A.
Rosenfield, The Counterfeit Drug Invasion: How Drug Reimportation
Unjustifiably Poses a Threat to the Health of the U.S. Public, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 1047, 1065–66 (2004).
114
Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability,
87 TEX. L. REV. 503, 566–67 (2009).
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naturally occurring or other sub-patentable compounds likely
deserve an investment in clinical research but the non-patentable
nature of the compound and the perceived inadequacy of relying
only on a relatively short period of data exclusivity to recoup the
investment and turn a profit may undermine the opportunity for
laboratories to perform this research.115
A. Overview of Proposed Solution
The proposed solution is this: offer innovators an extension of
the data exclusivity period available for a new product by up to four
years in all markets in which they do not apply for a patent.116 If a
patent had been applied for and granted, the applicant would be
required to let it lapse.117 If a patent was applied for and the
application rejected, an extension would be available, as this might
still incentivize research in areas where a patent would be
unavailable.
Applying for the extension would also require disclosure of
abridged clinical data results, subject to limits discussed below. This
is normatively aligned with recent developments favoring increased
data sharing about clinical trials, including the Principles for
Responsible Data Sharing (Principles) in and between the United
States and the European Union.118 “The Principles encourage
member companies to share scientific information, including
patient-level data and study protocols, from clinical trials on patients
115
See id. (discussing the value of subpatentable invention); see also Jerome
Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1781–82 (2000) (proposing
a liability regime rather than an exclusive right to protect subpatentable
inventions).
116
The expression up to four years is used here because, as explained in Part
V and the Appendix, the period could be shorter for developing countries.
117
See Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1521, 1525–26 (2005) (explaining the renewal fees payable in the United States
at three intervals during the life of a patent [three and a half years after issuance,
seven and a half years after issuance, and eleven and a half years after issuance]
and showing that “53.71% of all patentees do allow their patents to expire for
failure to pay one of their maintenance fees.”).
118
PHRMA & EFPIA, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA
SHARING: OUR COMMITMENT TO PATIENTS AND RESEARCHERS 1–2 (2013).

MAR. 2019]

The Patent Option

387

in the United States and European Union with qualified researchers
through individual agreements.”119 Recall that patents require an
enabling disclosure, but in the case of pharmaceuticals where
disclosure happens early (typically well before human clinical trials)
and is mired in “patentese,” the technical jargon too often used to
abscond true disclosure obligations.120 Data exclusivity can be even
worse in that respect as it may require only outcomes, without any
disclosure of test data, if they are positive enough to apply for
regulatory approval.121 The additional transparency required to
benefit from the Article’s proposed solution fixes this issue and
echoes calls for greater transparency in clinical data, as exemplified
at the 2017 World Health Assembly of the World Health
Organization (“WHO”) and in recent scholarship.122 The Article’s
proposal would ameliorate both the access and the transparency

119

Amy Westergren, The Data Liberation Movement: Regulation of Clinical
Trial Data Sharing in The European Union and The United States, 38 HOUS. J.
INT’L L. 887, 910 (2016).
120
See Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 621, 633–34 (2010) (“A crucial step in this process is transforming the
inventor’s plain English into patentese, the specialized language that patents are
written in. This transformation, whether deliberately or not, leads many
applicants to fall short of fulfilling the statutory mandate to provide a written
description using ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms.’”).
121
See Shreya Matilal, Do Developing Countries Need A Pharmaceutical
Data-Exclusivity Regime?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 268, 272 (2010)
(comparing disclosure obligations under the EU and US data exclusivity
regimes).
122
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL IN THE
CONTEXT OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH, doc. A70/A/CONF./9, at 6 (May 25,
2017) (calling for the preparation of “a comprehensive technical report to the
Executive Board at its 144th session that examines pricing approaches,
including transparency, and their impact on availability and affordability of
medicines . . . ”). The resolution was adopted on May 30, 2017. See World’s
Health Ministers Renew Commitment to Cancer Prevention and Control,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 30, 2017), http://www.who.int/cancer/media/news/
cancer-prevention-resolution/en/. For a discussion regarding the advantages of
greater transparency on clinical data, see, e.g., Jorge Contreras, Leviathan in the
Commons: Biomedical Data and the State, in GOVERNING MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 19, 35–42 (K.J. Strandburg, B.M. Frischmann & M.J.
Madison eds., 2017).
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issues raised at the Assembly while maintaining and possibly
improving incentives available to develop new pharmaceuticals.
The notion of abridged clinical data is used here to reflect the
fact that the full release of all clinical data may in some cases have
anticompetitive effects. To avoid letting this be used as a valid
argument against the proposal, it is suggested that where necessary
the regulator could provide limits on the required disclosure, upon
application by the innovator. In such a case, the determination of the
exact dataset that should be released and in which form should be
guided by a dual goal, namely to inform the public and the necessity
to protect legitimate competitive concerns of the applicant.123 That
said, the public’s right to know should allow access to all outcomes.
To quote Professor Rebecca Eisenberg, an expert in patent law and
the regulation of biopharmaceutical innovation, “[p]ublic
availability of data from clinical trials would also be valuable for
patients, doctors, and insurers, permitting them to make better
choices of drugs.”124
123

A similar idea is contained in a paper by Nicholson Price. See W.
Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1053 (2016) (“Public
disclosure of precise and enabling manufacturing methods could be made a
condition of FDA approval [in a mandate-based version] or could be
incentivized with an additional period of FDA-enforced regulatory exclusivity
[in an incentive-based version].”).
124
Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 738. An intriguing possible addition
to this part of the proposal would be to confer longer exclusivity in exchange for
the deposit of the original cell lines used to produce new biologics. Unlike small
molecule pharmaceuticals, biologics cannot be copied without access to the
innovator’s cell line, hence the term “biosimilar.” Access to the cell line is
critical in developing a biologics biosimilar. See Lisa Diependaele, Julian
Cockbain & Sigrid Sterckx, Similar or the Same? Why Biosimilars Are Not the
Solution, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 776, 777 (“As the original biologic’s cell line
and manufacturing process will be closely guarded as trade secrets, a generic
competitor will have no other option than to develop a new cell line.”); see also
Isabel Andujar Perez et al., Ensuring the Consistency of Biosimilars, 23
CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL DESIGN 1–6 (2017). Cell lines are not typically
disclosed in patent applications and in fact are often protected as trade secrets,
this making the production of a biosimilar much more expensive than the copy
of a small molecule. See Price II & Rai, supra note 123, at 1051–53 (suggesting
that there should be disclosure of the Chemistry and Manufacturing Controls of
Biologics Licensing Application [BLA] upon FDA approval).
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Administratively, the extension would be granted as soon as the
conditions just noted are complied with; that is, no substantive
examination would be required. Because the system is an extension,
it presupposes that a period of data exclusivity has already been
granted. The exclusivity during the extension period would be of the
same nature as the exclusivity it extends. Thus, in most cases it
would be non-reliance, but in the rare cases where full market
exclusivity has been granted, this would be the case also under the
extension. The public benefits of allowing non-market-based uses
and disclosure of test date would still obtain.125
One risk that innovators might see is that, for the small
proportion of patents on major innovations, there is a risk: the
product would not remain secret, especially during clinical trials,
and someone other than the innovator might get to the FDA first.126
This is why the Article’s proposal allows an innovator to apply for
a patent, but the innovator could not apply for the extension without
letting the patent lapse. On average, there are 12.3 years between
when a patent application is filed and when FDA approval is granted
for the corresponding product.127 In the biologics sphere, even with
patent term extension, primary patents are expected to expire, on
average, around five to eleven years after the expiration of the
market exclusivity period of twelve to twelve and a half years under
BPCIA.128 Recall that fees must be paid to maintain a patent in force
eleven to eleven and a half years after the date of issue (with sixmonth “grace periods” after each one). The average pendency of
applications is two years (at the USPTO), which means that a patent
is up for maintenance fee payment approximately thirteen years
after the date of application on average, based on the above numbers
seven months after the FDA has approved the product for marketing.
This option to apply for a patent, but then letting it lapse, would

125

See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 738.
See Ho, supra note 9.
127
Cárdenas-Navia, supra note 10, at 1320.
128
Heled, supra note 16, at 447.
126
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allow innovators time to fully test the new product before making a
decision on the patent option.129
The proposal is informed by some of the same insights used by
Greg Dolin to support his proposed solution, though limited to
genetic materials and suggesting marketing (not data) exclusivity
and aimed to free researchers to do research using genetic materials
without infringing patents while providing exclusivity to
innovators.130 Before looking into the details of the implementation
of the proposed solution, the Article explicates the advantages of the
proposed solution over the current regime.
B. Advantages of the Proposed Solution
The Article’s proposal is based on a voluntary, incentive-based
approach to limit the overlap between patent and data exclusivity by
focusing primarily on the latter. It would ameliorate current
outcomes for several reasons:
• First, patents on pharmaceuticals are applied for too early,
before any actual utility in treating disease in humans has
been shown. Data exclusivity is subject to a showing in
actual clinical trials that a new drug works.131 This means that
in one case (patents) a right is granted on a molecule or
compound that may not have any real utility, yet might not
be invalidated for this deficiency.132 In another case (data
129

The average pendency in 2017 at the USPTO was 24.2 months. See
USPTO, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FY 17 2 (2018), https://w
ww.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR.pdf.
130
See Dolin, supra note 29, at 1458–59 (“[T]he exclusive rights would be
broader than the current data-based provisions in the BPCIA, they would be, in
several respects, more limited than patent-based rights to exclude. First, and
most obvious, the exclusivity obtained through the FDA licensing scheme,
unlike that obtained via a patent, would not apply to every ‘use’ of the
product.”).
131
See USPTO, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
132
This is in part due to the standard for utility being very low in the United
States, especially in the pharmaceutical area. See Sarah Renée Craig, Placebo
Patents: Creating Stronger Intellectual Property Protection for
Pharmaceuticals Approved by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, 19 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 151 (2011) (“In the pharmaceutical context, the threshold
for meeting the utility requirement is relatively low.”).
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exclusivity), the “consideration” is real: the drug has
demonstrated its efficacy, subject to any additional postmarketing trials;133
Second, patents require novelty, which may discourage
innovators from investigating possible medical uses of
known compounds—for example, those based in traditional
medicinal knowledge—existing in naturally occurring
substances (such as plants), which would amount to nonpatentable subject matter in most cases.134 Providing better
protection for products brought to the market from this
source would open up an entirely new area to commercial
pharmaceutical research;
Third, the FDA and similar agencies in other nations review
clinical test data at a later stage than when patent protection
is applied for.135 Simply put, they have better data;
Fourth, because data exclusivity prevents reliance and
marketing in some cases, not mere “use,” competitors would
be allowed to test and use the drug without having to rely on
Bolar or similar exemptions.136 The possibility that would be

See Postmarketing Requirements and Commitments: Introduction, supra
note 48 (discussing the notion of post-marketing trials).
134
Often, looking at traditional medicine can serve as a basis to suggest
clinical trials, but traditional medicinal compounds are difficult to patent due to
lack of novelty. See Carlos M. Correa, Public Health and Patent Legislation in
Developing Countries, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 17 (2001) (“[T]he
novelty requirement will generally impede the patentability of such products.
Second, policy choices made to increase access to medicines, including a
limitative approach towards the patentability of natural occurring products and
uses of existing products, as well as strict patentability requirements, may lead
to the exclusion of protection for most traditional medicinal products.”); see also
Xuan Li & Weiwei Li, Inadequacy of Patent Regime on Traditional Medicinal
Knowledge–A Diagnosis of 13-Year Traditional Medicinal Knowledge Patent
Experience in China, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 125 (2007) (discussing the
protection by patent of traditional Chinese medicines); Chidi Oguamanam,
Patents and Traditional Medicine: Digital Capture, Creative Legal
Interventions, and the Dialectics of Knowledge Transformation, 15 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 489 (2008).
135
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
136
The name “Bolar” for exemptions allowing a generic manufacturer to use a
patented pharmaceutical to submit a marketing approval comes from Roche
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available to any third party to make and use new drugs is not
limited to regulatory approval. Patents allow a patent owner
to prevent the use of the invention by others. This means
that, absent an exemption in the statute or at common law, a
scientist cannot legally use the invention for her own
research. Though the risk of being sued is small, it is not nonexistent according to a case by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit where experimental use exception was
shrunk;137
Fifth, and relatedly, as a normative matter, scientific
research, whether it be purely noncommercial, commercial
(by a competitor), or indeed anywhere on the commercialnoncommercial continuum, should be allowed. Data
exclusivity does not stand in the way of researchers. In other
words, the underlying assumption of the proposal reveals the
purpose of exclusivity is to affect market incentives, not to
stifle research. Data exclusivity is best seen as instrumental
and not derived from some privilege vaguely anchored in
natural law. By allowing all non-market uses of the product
to be subject to data exclusivity, the proposal eliminates the
legal-cultural clash that may prevent scientists from working
on patented material; and, depending on shrinking

Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
a case in which the Federal Circuit determined that Bolar’s use of a patented
drug for testing purposes constituted patent infringement. Congress responded
by adopting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2018), which states in part that “[i]t shall not
be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United
States or import into the United States a patented invention . . . solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .” Id.; see
also Jian Xiao, Carving Out A Biotechnology Research Tool Exception to the
Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 23,
29–32 (2003) (discussing the case and the adoption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
137
Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This
case has been described as reflecting the increasingly commercial nature of
university-based research. See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University:
Shattering the Myth of Universities’ Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 175, 175 (2004) (“Pure academic research devoid of commercial
implications is becoming a rarity in an era of federal incentives to turn the fruits
of government-funded basic research into commercial applications.”).
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experimental use exception, by refocusing on selling of
approved drugs instead of laboratory experiments;138
Sixth, up to four years of additional protection is a major
addition to the current regime.139 By creating a “data
exclusivity extension opportunity, manufacturers will feel
more comfortable reinvesting their ROI in manufacturing
efficiency, and manufacturers can capitalize on the complexmolecule nature of their biologic by exploring
manufacturing drift.”140
Seventh, and relatedly, reducing reliance on patents reduces
in the same proportion the impact of changes to the realm of
patentable subject matter in recent Supreme Court opinions,
which apply to all existing patents in addition to all pending
applications.141 Those changes impact the pharmaceutical
industry, as the litigation concerning the BRCA gene tests
demonstrates.142
Eighth, data exclusivity is a safer form of protection unlike
patents, as it is not subject to invalidations by courts, thus
reducing litigation costs for both originators and generic
companies.143 Firms would gain a significant advantage:
predictability and significantly longer term of exclusivity.
The Damocles sword of invalidation that weighs heavily
over an innovator’s head would be removed;144
Ninth, because the second condition of the proposed solution
is to condition the extension of data exclusivity on the

See Jerome H. Reichman & Ruth L. Okediji, When Copyright Law and
Science Collide: Empowering Digitally Integrated Research Methods on a
Global Scale, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (2012) (referring to the
“anticommons effects attributed to excesses of the patent system in recent
years”); see also David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation: Historical
Linkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 294 (1991).
139
See discussion infra Section III.C.
140
Levi, supra note 69, at 970.
141
See cases cited supra note 5.
142
Id.
143
See Tu, supra note 103.
144
See supra notes 102–03, 143, and accompanying text.
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release of clinical data, the proposed solution improves the
quality of the disclosure exponentially (both for the public
and other scientists) compared to patent law.145 The
transparency that public availability of clinical data would
generate should lead to greater scientific accountability, less
duplication of basic research, and a significant improvement
in the quality of clinical trials themselves.146 In contrast,
patents disclose inventions but applicants often obfuscate
that disclosure by using “patentese.”147 Moreover, patent
applicants need not disclose much about the actual efficacy
of the claimed invention in large part because the application
predates human clinical trials, typically by several years.148
Tenth, FDA marketing approval, unlike the processing of
patent applications, is based on a scientific assessment, the
modalities of which can be modulated as science and
technology develop. Scientific advances do not change the
fundamental nature of the proposed solution, because they
are incorporated by the very fact that the assessment will

The nature of the information disclosed in the two systems (patent/data
exclusivity) is thus key. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 4, at 739 (“By
requiring that firms conduct rigorous clinical trials before bringing their
products to market and before making promotional claims for their products, the
FDA plays an important structural role in promoting a valuable form of
biomedical R&D that private firms are undermotivated to perform on their own,
while internalizing the costs of this R&D to the firms. By providing a system of
independent expert scrutiny of the resulting data and certifying the safety and
efficacy of tested products for particular indications, the FDA preserves public
confidence in the integrity of the results while preserving them as proprietary
information of the sponsor.”).
146
Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J.
845, 862–63 (2017).
147
See Seymore, supra note 120, at 638–39 (“While applicants view patentese
as an invaluable tool for protecting claim scope, it has drawbacks. First,
patentese obscures the invention. An interested reader must parse through the
broad terminology and jargon to figure out both what the inventor actually did
and intended to encompass by the claims. . . . Second, patentees use patentese to
sidestep enablement.”).
148
See Fachler, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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follow such changes. Hence, the proposed solution can be
seen as “technologically forward.”149
Eleventh, because patents would still remain available,
seeing whether pharmaceutical innovators pick them over
(longer) data exclusivity would provide a useful dataset to
gauge the perceived value of the two rights;
Twelfth, the proposal reduces the complex administrative
mechanism known as patent linkage, as fewer patents would
be in application or in force, as not having a patent (or letting
it lapse) would be a condition of applying for the
extension.150
Finally, any additional period of exclusivity would not be
based on a patent-specific evergreening game, but on tested
improvements accompanied by disclosure of additional
clinical data.151

C. Term of Protection
The twenty-year patent term is a mirage in the pharmaceutical
context: The twelve point three years average FDA approval period
leaves less than eight years of patent protection, with the added

149

The proposal is not entirely technology-neutral in that, like EU and US law
and the TPP, among others, it distinguishes biologics from small molecule
pharmaceuticals. Put differently, the proposed solution takes account of the
special nature of biologics (by proposing a different term). In doing so, it
follows the structure of the current regulatory regime, which treats biologics in a
distinct fashion. See supra Part II.E.
150
For those applicants who opt not to apply for a patent, see text
accompanying supra note 14.
151
On the notion of “evergreening,” see Mueller & Chisum, supra note 82
(indicating that there is a three-year period of exclusivity for new formulations
which bars the FDA from approving, when any application to market a generic
equivalent that relies on the information supporting the approval of the drug or
the change to the drug for which the information was submitted and the
exclusivity granted.); see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2018); 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.108 (2018); Levi, supra note 69, at 970; Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997),
extended by Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115
Stat. 1408 (2002).
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uncertainty of invalidation.152 The current system of data exclusivity
provides five years of exclusivity with possible extensions.153
In the case of biologics, patents are expected to expire
approximately five to eleven years after the expiration of the market
exclusivity period.154 Indeed, there is a sense among commentators
who have studied recent research in the field of biologics that an
extension is warranted—if done correctly.155 Vernon et al. suggested
sixteen years “to provide the necessary incentives for continued
biotech R&D investments. The high-risk and uncertain nature of
biotech R&D has been underscored by the effects of the economic
downturn on the biotech sector. A majority of biotech companies
. . . remained unprofitable.”156 Adding four years—thus bringing the
total to sixteen under US law—appears to be a decent compromise
close to this suggestion, creating sufficient incentives to avoid
overlapping protections by patent and to disclose abridged clinical
data. It is also in line with Levi’s suggested one to four years after
his own analysis.157
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
The Article’s proposal is compatible with the TRIPS
Agreement.158 The Agreement, which binds all members of the
World Trade Organization, contains minimum patentability
standards, and specific rules concerning the enforcement of patent
152

See Mansfield, supra note 3, at 103.
See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
154
Id.
155
Lietzan, supra note 28, at 103 (suggesting that “adoption of a base
exclusivity term for all drugs close to, or perhaps exceeding, the 12 years
currently in place for biological drugs--with a modest base extension for
incremental improvements, exclusivity on a product basis, and limitation of
abbreviated applications to actual replicas (no hybrids).”).
156
Vernon et al., supra note 62, at 74.
157
See Levi, supra note 69, at 912.
158
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [herinafter
TRIPS Agreement]. The Article does not suggest changes to the patent system.
Pharmaceutical inventors would voluntarily decide not to apply for a patent. See
id.
153
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and other intellectual property rights.159 A key rule contained in
TRIPS provides that patents should remain available for inventions
in all fields of technology.160 Hence the proposed solution—to
remain well within the boundaries of major international IP
instruments—does not limit the availability patents. TRIPS also
limits the ability of WTO Members to require disclosure test data to
the public, by subjecting the disclosure either to a necessity or
imposing protection against unfair commercial use. Disclosure that
the data originator would voluntarily agree to would not be subject
to such limits.
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), from which the United
States withdrew a few days after President Trump took office,
provided a general minimum term of five years of data exclusivity.161
For biologics, the TPP provided that countries “can either provide:
(1) eight years of market exclusivity counting from the date the
biologic is approved in the country concerned; or (2) five years of
market exclusivity counting from the date the biologic is approved
in the country concerned . . . and other measures to deliver a
comparable market outcome.”162 In the TPP, this is as far as the
intellectual property and data exclusivity norms go.163 The TPP,
without the US, renamed The Comprehensive and Progressive
159

DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 3, 420–27 (4th ed. 2013).
160
See id. at 421 (stating that TRIPS does not define the term “invention” thus
providing some leeway to WTO Members).
161
See Rubinson, supra note 20, at 461.
162
Id. at 465.
163
There is a possible interface with the investment protection chapter,
however. See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound:
Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines—Eli Lilly v. Canada
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 32–33
(2015) (“[A] Party might decide that it has a public-health flexibility-and a
human rights need-to enact an exception to TPP-based data exclusivity rights in
the event of the issuance of a TRIPS-or TPP-compliant compulsory license. The
adversely affected “investor” might conclude that the express language of the
TPPA IP chapter does not directly authorize such an exception and that the
failure to pay total compensation as opposed to a mere royalty is an indirect
expropriation.”). See generally Daniel Gervais, Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: Human Rights and Regulatory Lessons from Lilly v. Canada, 8 UC
IRVINE L. REV. 459 (forthcoming), for a discussion on the Lilly case.
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Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP), suspended all such provisions,
underscoring the disagreement among nations on granting
extensions of data exclusivity and setting rules for the future in the
stone of enforceable trade agreements.164 This provides a window of
opportunity to rethink data exclusivity and its interface with patents,
as this Article proposes.
The text of recent trade deals illustrates the urgency of clarity on
this point. For example, the EU-Japan trade deal signed in July 2018
provides for a “compensatory term of protection” (a maximum
compensatory term of five years after the time of signing) during
which “a patented invention cannot be worked due to marketing
approval process.”165 The effective extension of the patent term is
also proposed as part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP).166
Appendix B contains language that could be used in a future
trade agreement or to amend an existing one. Appendix A proposes
language for a possible amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to
clarify its existing article on data exclusivity.167 Amending TRIPS is
not inconceivable; the only amendment to that Agreement since its
entry into force on January 1, 1995 was made in the pharmaceutical
area.168

See GOV’T OF CANADA, supra note 20.
Annex to the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the
Economic Partnership Agreement Between the European Union and Japan,
COM (2018). The text of the deal was not finalized as of this writing, August
2018. See EU and Japan sign Economic Partnership Agreement, EUR.
COMM. (July 17, 2018), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=189
1.
166
This is according to a version of the draft text leaked in 2015. See
Knowledge Ecology International, 2015 Oct 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, art.
5.13, https://www.keionline.org/23060.; see also Acquah, supra note 19
(discussing the draft Transpacific Partnership Agreement). The RCEP involves
Australia, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea,
Thailand, and Vietnam. Id.
167
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 158, at art. 39.3.
168
Id. at art. 31bis (entering into force on Jan. 23, 2017). See TRIPS
Agreement, World Trade Organization, Jan. 23, 2017.
164
165
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The proposed solution is to extend data exclusivity periods by
four years for countries other than developing and least-developed
ones.169 The proposed solution exempts least-developed countries
from any obligation. The WTO has recognized indirectly that
intellectual property rights applied to pharmaceutical products do
not tend to generate positive welfare outcomes in least-developed
countries defined by the United Nations.170 This recognition comes
via the suspension of relevant TRIPS obligations for those countries
and allowing them to import pharmaceuticals produced under a
compulsory license in derogation to TRIPS Article 31(f), which
limits compulsory licenses “predominantly” to the supply of the
domestic market.171
For developing countries (those above the least-developed
country threshold but not fully economically developed), the
proposal is to keep the five year minimum (eight for biologics) and
three years for pharmaceuticals that meet the conditions of the
extension. At the same time, modulating the data exclusivity regime
by allowing those countries to grant to a competitor marketing

169

The proposal leaves it up to each jurisdiction to decide on ad hoc
extensions like those that exist in the United States for changes to the drug, such
as (in the United States) new uses or dosage forms that require submission of
new clinical data or pediatric trials. See European Modernization Act, supra
note 33.
170
U.N. COMM. FOR DEVELOPMENT POL’Y, UNITED NATIONS, List of Least
Developed Countries, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wpcontent/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2019)
(providing a list of least-developed countries, which is updated every three
years).
171
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 158, art. 31bis. On the suspension of TRIPS
obligations for least-developed countries, see World Trade Organization General
Council, Least Developed Country Members—Obligations Under Article 70.8
And Article 70.9 Of The Trips Agreement With Respect To Pharmaceutical
Products, WTO Doc. WT/L/971 (Nov. 30, 2015) (“The obligations of least
developed country Members under paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 70 of the
TRIPS Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until
1 January 2033, or until such a date on which they cease to be a least developed
country Member, whichever date is earlier.”).
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approval on payment of a reasonable royalty after a cool down
period of three years from the initial marketing approval.172
The proposal thus allows the calibration of incentives based on
the maturity of each nation or market.173 This is underpinned by the
premise that, although developing countries need not get free access
to all new pharmaceuticals, it is legitimate as a matter of public
health to let less economically developed nations calibrate their
level of protection.174
For the sake of completeness, there are two other aspects of this
debate that are not discussed in the Article’s proposal in large part
because they are unregulated and a matter of continuing
disagreement: (a) price-controls, which are not mentioned in the
TRIPS Agreement; and (b) the specific cases of short-term market
exclusivity, which the proposal, as it stands, neither mandates nor
prohibits.175 Both topics would warrant further discussion. The
related question of pharmacovigilance (monitoring post marketing
approval) is also left aside.176
V. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the dual protection of pharmaceuticals by patent
and data exclusivity laws and their overlaps, and the special case of
172

Under this proposal, during the cool down period no competitor could
apply for the right to rely on an existing marketing approval. See Moore, supra
note 117. As explained above, in all cases, an extension of the data exclusivity
period (which could be less than four years for those countries) would be
conditioned on the absence of a patent application and agreement to publicly
disclose clinical data. Id.
173
See DANIEL GERVAIS, IP Calibration, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE
AND DEVELOPMENT 86, 103–05 (2d ed. 2014).
174
See id.
175
On price controls for pharmaceuticals, see U.S. DEP’T. OF COM., INT’L
TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND INNOVATION 3 (2004), http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/health/DrugPricingStudy.
pdf (“All OECD governments studied in this report rely on some form of price
controls to manage spending on pharmaceuticals.”).
176
See Felix Shin, Leaping from the “Patent Cliff” into the “Global Drug
Gap”: Overcoming Exclusivity to Provide Affordable Biosimilars, 37 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 449 (2016).
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biologics, the Article proposes to offer innovators in the
pharmaceutical field an extension of their data exclusivity period in
exchange for refraining from applications, maintaining current
patent protection, or releasing clinical trial results. The Article can
be read as an invitation to reflect on the current regulatory incentives
for privately funded pharmaceutical research.
APPENDICES
A. Possible Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement
Article 39bis
Data Exclusivity
1. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable
effort, shall protect prevent any person other than the person that
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, from relying
on such data in support of an application for product approval for a
period of not less than five years or eight years (the “non-reliance
period”) in the case of biologics.177
2. Members shall extend the period of time mentioned in the
previous paragraph by four years if (a) no patent has been applied
for in respect of the pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical
product submitted for marketing approval and (b) the person that
submitted the product for approval gives permission to disclose to
the public an abridged version of such data.
3. In deciding what constitutes an abridged version of the data,
Members hall take account both of the need to inform the public of
the benefits and risks of the product submitted for approval and of
the need to protect confidential competitive information, if any,
contained in the data submitted by the person who submitted them.

For the purposes of this Article, a “biologic” may be defined as a virus,
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.
177
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4.A developing country Member is entitled to limit the nonreliance period mentioned in paragraph 1 to three years, after which
time it can allow a person other than the person who submitted the
data to rely on such data in support of an application for product
approval subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty to the person
who submitted the data for the remainder the non-reliance period
including any extension thereof in accordance with paragraph 2.
5. A least developed country Member shall have no obligation
under this Article until 1 January 2033. The Council for TRIPS
shall, upon duly motivated request by a least-developed country
Member, accord extensions of this period.
B. Possible Article for a Free Trade Agreement
Article __178
Data Exclusivity
1. Parties, when requiring, as a condition of approving the
marketing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed
test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable
effort, shall protect prevent any person other than the person that
submitted them may, without the latter’s permission, from relying
on such data in support of an application for product approval for a
period of not less than five years or eight years (the “non-reliance
period”) -in the case of biologics.*
2. Parties shall extend the period of time mentioned in the
previous paragraph by four years if (a) no patent has been applied
for in respect of the pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical
product submitted for marketing approval and (b) the person that
submitted the product for approval gives permission to disclose to
the public at least an abridged version of such data.
3. In deciding what constitutes an abridged version of the data,
Parties shall take account both of the need to inform the public of
the benefits and risks of the product submitted for approval and of
the need to protect confidential competitive information, if any,
contained in the data submitted by the person who submitted them.

178

In the case of the TRIPS Agreement, this would likely be Article 39bis.
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4. A developing country Party is entitled to limit the nonreliance period mentioned in paragraph 1 to three years, after which
time it can allow a person other than the person who submitted the
data to rely on such data in support of an application for product
approval subject to the payment of a reasonable royalty to the person
who submitted the data for the remainder the non-reliance period
including any extension thereof in accordance with paragraph 2.
______________
* For the purposes of this Article, a “biologic” may be defined as a virus,
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings.

